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STATUTORY RESTRICTIONS ON THE POWER OF COURTS TO PUNISH FOR
CONTEMPT.
In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri recently,
State v. Shepherd, 76 S. W. 79, an editor was fined for contempt
for publishing an article accusing the court of corruption. This
charge was made in connection with a case in which a motion for
rehearing was then pending before the court. The statutes of
Missouri, however, attempt to expressly define and limit the powers
of courts in dealing with contempts, providing ,that "every court
of record shall have power to punish, as for contempt, persons guilty
of any of the following acts and no other," following which is an
enumeration of five classes of acts which can, under no construction,
include newspaper publications. In an interesting criticism the
American Law Review (Sept.-Oct., i9O3,) vigorously excepts to
the action of the court as overriding that sovereignty which may
properly be predicated of the legislature, and hence as "absolutely
illegal and subversive of our free institutions."
Putting aside, however, all questions of the expediency of the
exercise of its powers by the court in this case, ample authority
supports the Missouri court. It has assumed an inherent constitu-
tional right to punish contempts; a right not susceptible of abridg-
ment even by legislative enactment. This assumption is sustained
by State v. Morrill, i6 Ark. 384, in which the statute rejected by the
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court as not binding upon it was substantially identical with that
involved in the present case. See also Little v. State, 9o Ind. 338;
Hale v. State, 55 Ohio St., 21o; Hawes v. State, 46 Neb. 149. "That
it is not competent for the legislature to abridge the powers of
courts to punish summarily such wrongful acts as obstruct the
administration of justice has been held in well-considered cases.
The conclusion is a necessary inference from the very numerous
cases in which it has been held that the power inheres in courts
independently of legislative authority. A power which the legisla-
ture does not give, it cannot take away. If power, distinguished
from jurisdiction, exists independently of legislation, it will continue
to exist notwithstanding legislation." Hale v. State, supra. The
Supreme Court of the United States has expressed doubt as to
whether an act of Congress limiting the powers of the United
States courts to punish for contempt would be binding upon it,
while at the same time deciding that the act was binding upon the
lower courts which were themselves created by Congress. Ex parte
Robinson, 19 Wall. 505. The only case maintaining the opposite
view seems to be In re Oldham, 89 N. C. 23, where handbills con-
taining an account of a case were given to a juror summoned to
serve at a term of court at which the case was to come up for trial.
It was held that the statute was operative in confining contempts to
the acts specified.
While the power of the legislature to abridge is thus almost
universally denied, it is acknowledged that it may regulate the
methods of procedure, and that such regulations will be binding.
Wyatt v. People, 17 Colo. 252; In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526.
WILL EQUITY ENFORCE A FORFEITURE?
Until within a few years it has been universally held by courts
of equity that no principle was more firmly established than this,
that Equity will never lend its aid actively to enforce a forfeiture.
Story says, "It is a universal rule in equity, never to enforce a for-
feiture." 2 Story Eq. fur., section 1319. In I Por. Eq. fur. section
459, 46o it is stated that, "It is a well-settled and familiar doctrine
that a court of equity will not enforce a forfeiture. The few apparent
exceptions to this doctrine are not real exceptions, since they all
depend upon other rules and principles. * * * There are, in
fact, no exceptions to this doctrine; those which appear to be excep-
tions, are not so in reality." See also 2 Beach Eq. fur. 1013. Very
recently, however, certain courts, and following them the text-
book authors, have apparently concluded that the rule has been
too broadly expressed, and have introduced certain exceptions which
appear to be not merely apparent but real. Thus Mr. Bispham says:
"In some cases, however, the enforcement of a forfeiture may be
regarded in equity with favor." Bisp. Eq. section 181 (6th ed.);
citing Brown v. Vandergrift, 8o Pa. St. 142 (1875). In that case
there was a lease of oil lands for 20 years, with a stipulation for
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forfeiture unless operations should be commenced within sixty
days. The lessee did not commence operations and further failed to
pay his monthly rent as agreed. At the end of fifteen months
a court of equity forfeited the lease on the ground that in such a
case time was of the essence of the contract, and that equity would
follow the law and enforce a forfeiture in order to do justice. The
rule was stated to be that though equity abhors a forfeiture when it
works a loss that is contrary to equity, it will enforce a forfeiture
when to do so will work equity and protect the party seeking the
forfeiture against the indifference and laches of the other party.
This qualified statement of the rule was approved and followed,
in a case involving a similar state of facts, in Monroe v. Arm-
.strong, 96 Pa. St. 307 (188o). In a very recent case in Michigan,
(Negaunee Iron Co. v Iron Cliffs Co., 96 N. W. 468) it has had the
sanction of the Supreme Court of that State also.
In this case a mining-lease for ninety-nine years was made to the
defendant corporation in 1857, the lessor reserving to himself an
individual one-half of all minerals contained in the property. The
lessee made no attempts to mine on the land other than to make
slight explorations. Later the complainant corporation acquired the
interest of the lessor, expended large amounts, and developed val-
uable mines on the property. In i9oo the defendant corporation,
which during the intervening period had stood by in silence and
done nothing, served notice on the complainants that it proposed
to commence operations under its lease. On a bill to quiet title being
filed, a court of equity decreed the forfeiture of the defendant's
lease.
These cases seem to establish a well-marked and well-founded
exception to the general rule. The express purpose of the com-
plainants in coming into equity was to enforce forfeitures, and the
decrees of the courts were intended to accomplish that result. It
seems hardly possible to say, in view of the facts, that these cases
present exceptions which are "apparent, and not real." They
come in none of the classes of what Prof. Pomeroy terms "apparent
exceptions." We seem to see in them rather an illustration of the
unwillingness of equity to be bound by any rule, however apparently
universal, when its application would result in iniquity rather than
equity; and of the "creative faculty" of equity which, as Mr. Bisp-
ham expresses it, has given birth in the past to the principles which
compose it, and still continues in modem times to be energetic and
productive, constantly modifying the old doctrines and inventing
new ones, as justice demands.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE MINIMUM WAGE LAW.
It is doubtful if any doctrine advanced by the courts in recent
years has met with more general difference of opinion than that
class of cases in which the legislature has attempted to exercise its
police power in favor of some special class of people or of the
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supposed betterment of social conditions. In the last thirty years
these cases have arisen with marked frequency and there is appar-
ently no limit on which they may touch. By the decision of the
Supreme Court of Indiana in the recent case of Street v. Varney
Electrical Supply Co., 66 U. E. 895, another extension of the police
power at the hands of the legislature has met frustration under cover
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The validity of a statute which declared that unskilled labor
employed on the public work of the State or its political subdivisions
should not be paid less than twenty cents per hour and that a
contractor who did not comply with the statute should be guilty of
a misdemeanor, was before the Indiana court. In the case then at
bar, a laborer belonging to the class benefitted by the legislative
enactment sued a private domestic corporation, which was engaged
in the construction of an electric lighting plant for the city of
Richmond, for wages due under the statutory provision. The court
held that the act of the legislature was invalid on several grounds:
(i) that it was an unreasonable assumption, by the legislature, of
power over municipal corporations by the confiscation of the prop-
erty of taxpayers in forcing them to pay a specified price for labor
on public works; (2) that it operated to deprive a citizen of his
property without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and (3) that it was class
legislation
In so deciding this case, the court follows the decision of the
Court of Appeals of New York in the case of People, ex rel. Rogers,
v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i. These two decisions seem to be the only
authorities bearing directly on minimum wage laws. In the New
York case, a statute providing that laborers on public work should
be paid not less than going wages was involved. In the majority
opinion, Justice O'Brien strongly condemned such an invasion of
municipal rights by legislative enactment. It was remarked in his
opinion that by these laws, "the right which is conceded to every
private individual and every private corporation in the State to
make their own contracts and their own bargains is denied to cities
and contractors for city work. * * * The exercise of such a
power by the legislature is inconsistent with the principles of civil
liberty, the preservation and enforcement of which was the main
purpose when the Constitution was adopted * * * The power to
deprive master and servant of the right to agree upon the rate of
wages which the latter was to receive is one of the things which
can be regarded as impliedly prohibited by the fundamental law
upon consideration of its whole scope and purpose." In view of
the position which the courts of New York have generally taken with
regard to the exercise of the police power, this seems to be a true
statement of the principles which ought to govern a like case. It
was contended, in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Parker,
that while such a statute could not be applied to private corporations,
yet as cities are mere creatures of the State for the purposes of
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municipal government and there was no restriction in the State
constitution on the legislative right to enact laws fixing the rate
which laborers on public work should receive, the statute
should be upheld. But it would seem indeed an unwarrantable
interference of civic rights that a municipal corporation's ability to
contract for its public works should be subordinated at will to the
legislative authority which, in the course of events, might tend to
most dangerous results. The principles of taxation as well as
the Constitution of the country would thereby be violated.
The contention at times has been made by certain advocates of
labor, and those interested in the solution of social problems, that the
legislature might constitutionally fix minimum wages to govern
private as well as public corporations. It is to be hoped that this
mooted question will definitely be settled by the opinions of the
highest courts in two of the States, as expressed in the above cited
cases.
JURISDICTION OVER FOREIGN CORPORATIONS.
In the case of Central Grain and Stock Exchange of Hammond,
appellant, v. the Board of Trade of the City of Chicago, not yet
reported, but to be found in Chicago Legal News for Oct. IO, the
necessity of deciding jurisdictional facts before considering the
merits of a cause was passed upon. In that case the Board of
Trade filed a bill to restrain the appellant, defendant below, from
using its stock quotations without permission. A subpcena was
served on the secretary and in due course the appellant appeared
specially for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction, and on
affidavits to the effect that the appellant was a foreign corporation
not doing business in the State, or capable of doing business in the
State, or ever having done business in the State, or having any
officers in the State for the purpose of transacting the business of
the appellant, moved to quash the writ of service. The court re-
ferred the question of jurisdiction to a master, and later, on motion
of the plaintiff, who had been unable to serve the president of
appellant as a witness before the master, ordered the appellant tQ
cause the president to appear by a certain date. As the president
did not appear a second motion was granted ordering the appellant
to cause its president to appear or an injunction would issue as
prayed by the plaintiff. On default of the president an order was
issued to the master to defer his report until the president should
appear before him, and a preliminary injunction was issued against
the appellant. From this the appellant appealed. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the order was
unwarranted and dismissed the injunction. The conclusion reached
would doubtless be followed except in those States where an appeal
is held to be a waiver of jurisdictional rights; Fee v. Big Sand Iron
Co., 13 Oh. St. 563; Ruthe v. Ry., 37 Wis. 344; Hodges v. Frazier,
31 Ark. 58; Ry. v. Heath's Adm'r., 87 Ky. 651; and possibly in
COMMENT.
Texas, where it has been held that appearance by a non-resident
person, or corporation, when sued by citation, although expressly
to plead to jurisdiction, is a waiver. York v. State, 73 Tex. 65i.
The federal authorities are uniform to the effect that appeal does
not waive the right to plead to jurisdiction, provided a special ap-
pearance for the purpose of asserting these defects was interposed
before a plea to the merits was made necessary by the overruling
of the motion to set aside service. I Foster's Federal Practice, 272;
Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476.
Granting the truth of the appellant's affidavits, what would
have resulted had he disregarded the injunction, or a judgment of
the lower court instead of appealing as he did?
i. As to the effect of an injunction granted without jurisdiction
over the person see Hart v. Sansom, iio 1. S. 154; Bisph. Eq. 67.
In granting injunctions the court acts in personam. The persons
to which its orders are addressed must be within reach of the court,
or amenable to its jurisdiction; Kerr lnjunc. 6: "While it is seen
that courts of equity exact the most implicit obedience to the writ
of injunction, and treat its willful -violation as a most flagrant con-
tempt of court, the docTrine-is to be understood with the qualification
that the court has jurisdiction over the subject-matter"; High In-
junc., sec. 1425, and in proceedings for contempt the proper inquiry
is whether the court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject-
matter, High Injunc., sec. 1416; State v. Baldwin, 57 Ia. 266.
2. As to the effect of a judgment. A judgment would be void,
12 Ency. Pl. & Prac. i79; for a valid judgment in personam cannot
be obtained against one not in the jurisdiction who has not been
personally served with process. Pope v. Terre Haute Car & Mfg.
Co., 87 N. Y. 137. And by the great weight of authority there
was no valid service, the rule being that if the corporation is not
doing business within the State, service on an officer casually within
the State is not service on the corporation. Marshall Corp. 1200;
St. Clair v. Cox, io6 U. S. 350; Goldey v. The Morning News Co.,
156 U. S. 518. The agency of the person served for the purpose
of accepting service must appear of record or any judgment is open
to attack by showing it is void for want of jurisdiction. 6 Thomp.
Corp., sec. 75o6; Barrow S. S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U. S. 1oo.
From the above it appears that the appellant might have dis-
regarded the action of the lower court provided his jurisdictional
affidavits should be upheld.
